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CONSTITUTIONAL-CIVIL
I. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Anderson's Paving Inc. v. Hayes, 295 S.E.2d 805 (W. Va. 1982)
In Anderson's Paving Inc. v. Hayes,1 the plaintiff corporation wished to
make contributions in support of the passage of the "Roads for Jobs and Pro-
gress Amendment" which was proposed for ratification at a special election on
November 3, 1981. Some months before the election, the plaintiffs wrote to the
defendant prosecuting attorney, asking whether they would be prosecuted
under the West Virginia Code,2 which prohibited the expenditure of corporate
monies on direct corporate speech in support of any candidate or any side of a
referendum.
When the prosecuting attorney replied that they would be prosecuted, the
plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking to have the statutes de-
clared unconstitutional. After the circuit court ruled that the statutes did vio-
late the constitutional standards, it certified the question to the supreme court,
which affirmed the ruling.
Both the circuit court and the supreme court relied on the United States
Supreme Court's decision in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,3 which
struck down a similar Massachusetts statute. In its opinion, the Supreme
Court noted that the sort of political subject matter which was restricted by
the Massachusetts statute was "at the heart of the First Amendment's protec-
tion," and that the fact that the speaker was a corporation was irrelevant in
determining whether speech relating to issues was protected.4
The Belloti court distinguished corporate spending on behalf of candidates
from spending on behalf of an issue, and ruled that the latter was constitution-
ally protected.5 In his opinion for the state court, Justice Neely noted that
while the majority did not agree with the conclusions of the Supreme Court,
they were nevertheless bound to follow them, and that the sections of the West
Virginia Code that prohibited corporate speech on behalf of election issues
were unconstitutional. Applying the doctrine of "least intrusive remedy" the
court upheld the other sections of the statutes.7
II. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
State v. Riddle, 285 S.E.2d 359 (W. Va. 1981)
State v. Riddle" was a test case brought by the parents of two school-aged
295 S.E.2d 805 (W. Va. 1982).
W. VA. CODE §§ 3-8-8, 3-9-14 (1979).
3 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
4 Id. at 776-84.
5Id.
295 S.E.2d at 807.
Id.
' 285 S.E.2d 359 (W. Va. 1981).
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children. They had been prosecuted for violating the state's compulsory school
attendance law, and raised the unconstitutionality of the statute as a defense.
Specifically, they argued that it violated the "free exercise of religion" guaran-
teed by the first amendment.
Appellants' reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Wisconsin v.
Yoder9 was not well founded because of the factual differences in the two
cases. In Yoder, the Amish practice of not sending children to public school
past the eighth grade was upheld, but there "the Supreme Court was con-
fronted with an ancient religious community which. . .had its own system
of. . .training designed to prepare its children for life" in that community. 10
The Amish children completed the first eight years of their education in public
schools, and so were equipped with basic skills that might enable them to live
outside the community, should they so choose.
The court noted that the parents in Riddle belonged to a small, conserva-
tive religious sect, which was apparently quite isolated from the mainstream of
society. They taught their children at home in order to insure their total indoc-
trination with their religious beliefs. One of the children was only ten,1 ' and
the court expressed concern that she would not be able to live successfully in
contemporary society, should she ever choose to do so, if she were never ex-
posed to any other side of the issue than the one her parents chose for her.
Sincerely held religious convictions may occasionally be overridden by the
compelling state interest in the well-being of its youngest citizens. 2 Schools do
not just teach, they also minister to the basic health needs of children and
provide some protection against parental abuse, the court noted, before saying:
We find it inconceivable that in the twentieth century the free exercise clause
of the first amendment implies that children can lawfully be sequestered on a
rural homestead during all of their formative years to be released upon the
world only after their opportunities to acquire basic skills have been foreclosed
and their capacity to cope with modern society has been so undermined as to
prohibit useful, happy or productive lives.13
Moreover, the statutory provisions allow parents to qualify to give instruction
to their children, and provide a "sound vehicle" for balancing the conflicting
interests raised here, the court noted in affirming the convictions. 4 The par-
ents had not even attempted to comply with the statutory requirements.
III. RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS
Sargus v. State Board of Law Examiners, 294 S.E.2d 440 (W. Va. 1982)
The thirty day residency requirement for taking the state bar exam was
* 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
10 285 S.E.2d at 361.
1 Id. at 362.
12 Id. at 365.
Is Id. at 366.
14 Id. at 366-67.
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struck down as unconstitutional in Sargus v. State Board of Law Examiners.15
Petitioner Sargus lived in Ohio, and took a job with a Wheeling firm. The
Board of Law Examiners informed her that she would not be permitted to take
the state bar exam because she could not meet the residency requirement, so
she petitioned the court."0 The court found that the statute bore no "substan-
tial relationship" to the state interest in protecting the public from unqualified
attorneys, and struck it down as a violation of the privileges and immunities
clause.1"
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15 294 S.E.2d 440 (W. Va. 1982).
16 Id. at 441.
-7 Id. at 445, 446.
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